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The European Union is facing a political crisis unprecedented in its 59-year history. This club of democratic
countries established primarily to promote peace and prosperity in post-war Europe is facing a nationalist and
populist surge that threatens the democratic principles at the very heart of the EU. Capitalizing on the European
sovereign debt crisis; backlash against refugees streaming in from the Middle East, Brexit and public angst over
the growing terror threat, previously fringe political parties are growing with alarming speed.
The blame falls in part on both center-right and center-left party leaders who have failed to respond effectively to
the European debt crisis. This fact is often obscured with the current focus on migration crisis as the single most
important contributor to the populist’s surge. As Vivien Schmidt correctly argues, it is “neo-liberalism gone too
far”, which is the major contributor to anger that fuels the rise of populism in Europe and elsewhere in the world.
The ruling parties’ obsession with fiscal austerity, and with supply-side policies of privatization, deregulation and
liberalization, effectively triggered a ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation, rising unemployment, increasing
poverty, and dwindling EU solidarity that paved the way for the poisonous ultra-nationalism now on the rise. All
this has driven trust in the EU at an all-time low, and fueled pathologies not seen since the 1930s, placing
Europe’s integration project on truly precarious ground. 
But, as the authors of The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream – edited by Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs and
Christian Joerges – argue, the institutional responses to the crisis very much represented a continuation of a
Union way of doing thing. Therefore the evolution of the crisis was not merely a result of economic and fiscal
policy choices but reflected broader structural features of the European Union construction which the crisis
exposed (p.6). One of these features, which occupies an important place in the book, is the emergence of a new
constitutional order in the EU, focused on “sacralisation” (p.8) of balanced budgets and fiscal discipline, leading
to a new “austerity” Union. With several Treaty amendments and other ‚turbo-speed‘ legislative activities aimed
to solve the euro-zone debt crisis, the Centre-Right coalition under a strong hegemony of the German
Chancellor Merkel has fundamentally transformed the European “economic constitution”. With adoption of the
Fiscal Treaty, ESM, European Semester, Euro Plus Pact, Six Pack, the EU risks undermining the ’substantive
balance‘ between the market integration and social policy that sustains the legitimacy of the integration project.
While previous Treaty amendments tilted the EU economic constitution strongly into the neo-liberal direction,
they nonetheless included legal provisions protecting redistributive autonomy of member states at the national
level. This time, to quote Chalmers, the ‚Union has been transformed into a political system redistributing
significant wealth within its territory‘. For the first time in the EU history we see an emergence of a new economic
constitution which explicitly entrenches one economic paradigm at the expense of other alternatives, with
simultaneously dismantling the remaining protections of social policy autonomy of member states. This approach
is not only constitutionally problematic, but also economically questionable. It threatens the very existence of the
EU as we have known it. The economic theory behind all these rules is that a profligacy of ‚irresponsible‘ states
and their public sectors is the main reason for the current euro crisis. Hence, the best approach to solve the
crisis is to impose strict new rules which aim to discipline such ‚irresponsible‘ countries. In other words, the
imposition of strict austerity through balanced budgets and stricter fiscal rules became the new, dominant
economic ideology of the EU’s current leadership, led by Merkel. Despite the fact that the austerity approach
rests on a wrong diagnosis of the euro crisis, that it does not work economically, and that it has strong negative
economic and social consequences for indebted countries, it still remains the virtually unchallenged ‚official‘
economic doctrine of the current EU leadership.
The good news is that this trend can be reversed—but only if European political leaders articulate a coherent
alternative to the failed neo-liberal economic policies of the last decade. An economic policy that promotes
growth, better jobs and wages, and social inclusion can stem the nationalist tide. To prevent history from
repeating itself, Europe must act now. Since the beginning of the Euro-zone economic crisis in 2009,
governments across Europe have single-mindedly embraced fiscal austerity. This has meant double-digit
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government spending cuts, and the elevation of the austerity paradigm spearheaded by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel to an essentially ‘unbreakable law.’ The new Fiscal Compact, a treaty signed by all EU members
except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, effectively outlaws the counter-cyclical economic policies
espoused by Keynesianism, and establishes austerity and balanced budgets as the new fundamental principles
of the EU constitutional order. As one American observer noted sarcastically, such developments should make
Tea Party loyalists in the United States green with envy. The Fiscal Compact deviates from traditional EU values
of democracy, institutional balance and the equality of member states. It empowers European bureaucrats,
judges and bankers at the expense of European citizens. As a result, the Fiscal Compact seriously preempts the
most basic democratic principles and values of the EU. While it is true that the Fiscal Compact mostly
reproduces already existing provisions of EU law, its importance should not be underestimated. First, its core
provision, Article 3, requires a transposition of the golden rule of balanced budgets into member states’ national
constitutions. As a consequence, the economic theory of austerity will be, for the first time in the EU history,
constitutionalised on both the EU and national level. In other words, Keynesianism is ruled out precisely when it
is most needed. Article 3 (2) requires that provisions in national constitutions have “binding force and permanent
character”. Hence, the new Austerity Union will be almost impossible to change. Second, it restricts fiscal policy
of member states more than the existing EU Treaty does. Third, access to financial assistance under ESM will be
conditional, from 1 March 2013, on prior ratification of the Fiscal Compact. After the European Court of Justice
ruling in the Pringle case, where the Court basically constitutionalised the principle of strict conditionality from the
ESM Treaty, countries seeking financial assistance from ESM will be subjected to even more explicit forms of
fiscal retrenchment imposed through the Memoranda of Understanding which struggling Member States have to
“negotiate” with the troika made up of the EU Commission, the IMF and the ECB.
It is a surprise then that authors like Wolfgang Streeck, Fritz Scharpf and Perry Anderson describe this situation
as sovereignty “on paper”, an “occupation regime by the “Troika”, and a troika diktat regime “reminiscent of
Austria in 1922, when the Entente, under League of Nations colors, posted a high commissioner to Vienna to run
the economy” . It is obvious that in the new Austerity Union, countries like Greece, Portugal and Ireland will be
treated differently from other states in the EU. For example, Ireland, the only country to have a referendum on
the Fiscal Compact, voted for the Compact, but, with the EU gun to its head, as the Irish media sarcastically
reported. Or, in Slovenia, another small EU country, the Constitutional Court justified its ban of two referendums
on the government austerity package legislation with references to the Fiscal Compact even before it entered
into force. What these cases show is that the profound transformation of the EU constitutional order is altering
the “original” constitutional balance in the European Union. The new Austerity Constitution deepens the divide
between the core and periphery in the Union.
The Fiscal Compact has brought not only a deep intrusion into the fiscal maneuvering room of the member
states. It is also too rigid and too restrictive in terms of its budgetary and fiscal rules. Although many of its rules
are ambiguous, that does not solve the problem of rigidity of its main “targets”: i.e. rules on allowed structural
budget deficit and public debt. As the IMK study shows, few of the EU countries undergoing severe economic
crisis would be able to implement these rules without seriously undermining its prospects for future economic
growth. Likewise, one of the leading legal EU scholars, Damien Chalmers, argues that obligations from the
Fiscal Compact have to be assessed in a particular socio-economic context. This leads him to an important
observation about a differentiated impact of the Fiscal Compact on two different groups of countries: those few
like Germany, Finland, Luxemburg and Estonia who already have a balanced budget will not be particularly
affected, whereas the overwhelming majority of others will face very demanding requirements. Needless to say,
countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain may in fact in the end achieve required “targets” but the cost for that is
already prohibitively high. Greece, for example, a country ranked 18th according to the UN Human Development
Index in 2008, is today on the verge of a humanitarian crisis.
However, the fact that that largely arbitrary rules on debt and deficit have already had a detrimental effect can
also be clearly seen also from those countries which are used as role models for fiscal rules. Switzerland, which
first introduced the debt brake in 2003, today has indeed a very low debt-to-GDP ratio, but its levels of public
investments are among the lowest in the developed world (please read the analysis here). Germany, the main
“exporter” of balanced budget rules and debt brakes also faces a critical lack of public investment in areas such
as green energy and education.
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From the perspective of comparative constitutional law, the Fiscal Compact opens another important
constitutional issue: is a constitution the appropriate place to entrench a particular economic ideology or policy?
As Justice Holmes argued in his famous Lochner dissent, people in democracies have different, often opposing
views on economic policy. It would therefore be wrong to entrench one particular economic ideology/policy in the
constitution. In Hollande’s opposition to transpose the Fiscal Compact into the French constitution, we can
clearly see the echo of Holmes’s argument. Hollande’s argument was that the constitution is a lasting document
which should not be used for short term policy objectives. As a result, France announced that it will transpose
the golden rule of balanced budget into their organic law. Several other countries debated whether to include the
golden rule in their constitution or legislation. Such a decision is part of the constitutional and institutional
tradition of each of the countries, and there can be no universal proscription as to what and when to include or
exclude from the constitutions. To include a certain economic doctrine at the constitutional level may shrink the
space for constitutional pluralism and the democratic deliberation processes. It may lead to the impoverishment
of the public discourse on alternative possibilities and impoverish the level of constitutional democracy.
By introducing “a double bind”, first on the EU level in the Fiscal Compact, and second in national constitutions
incorporating the golden rule into their provisions, EU law constitutionalizes austerity as a permanent character
of the EU constitutional order. Moreover, by introducing such changes without a proper democratic procedure, it
also preempts democracy as a guiding principle of EU politics.
It is no surprise then that even such pro-EU figures as Jacques Delors fiercely criticise the Fiscal Compact. In a
speech in the European Parliament, Delors referred to the Fiscal Compact as a gas factory (“usine a gaz”). For
lawyers, it is also very indicative that some of the leading European legal experts, such as Jean-Claude Piris,
have expressed their doubts. Piris, the former director general of the EU Council’s legal service who helped pen
the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon treaties, referred to the EU’s new Fiscal
Compact as a “little piece of paper” and “a treaty outside a treaty” that could not stop the financial crisis. He has
also mentioned that the austerity measures have a limited reach. He recommended that the national parliaments
have a greater say in addressing the European financial and economic crises to ensure democratic legitimacy.
The problem is that this myopic austerity focus rests on a misdiagnosis of the Euro crisis; has backfired
economically, and has triggered grave social and economic repercussions in indebted countries. Nevertheless,
austerity remains the virtually unchallenged ‘official’ EU economic doctrine. What Europe needs more than
anything is a new anti-austerity coalition. Only a Europe willing to revert back to some basic Keynesian policies
of economic stimulus, as the US government did at the outset of Barack Obama’s presidency, combined with
economic innovations that include much-needed investments in infrastructure, education, and social programs,
can restore Europe to stability, and reverse its dangerous nationalist surge.
Unfortunately, the politically weakened European mainstream parties — the traditional standard bearers of the
post-World-War-II “embedded liberalism” consensus — are now on the defense. Instead of offering novel
progressive solutions, the mainstream seems extremely vulnerable to the populist challenge coming both from
the extreme Right and extreme Left. Instead of surrendering to the populist’s false promises of quick fixes, the
mainstream has to reinvent itself. It must respond to the social anxieties that are helping fuel nationalist
populism. Populist leaders are promising better pensions, health care and more jobs, an agenda that is winning
over the abandoned working class communities that were once a stronghold of the European social democratic
and other progressive parties. Leaders of the socially oriented parties can reverse the nationalist trend by
returning the EU to its initial role as the promoter of European solidarity and equality, specifically through job
training, ‘green’ growth and other public investments. As the humiliating defeat of Greece’s Leftist government by
the German-led austerity coalition illustrates, this will take a concerted, Europe-wide initiative. If European
democrats of various political colours don’t start offering a more compelling agenda, Europe is on a dangerous
political path.
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